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Amal Movement

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Amal Movement
حركة أمل
AbbreviationAmal, أمل
ChairmanNabih Berri
FoundersMusa al-Sadr
Hussein el-Husseini
Mostafa Chamran[1]
Grégoire Haddad[2][3]
Ragheb Harb[4]
Founded6 July 1974
HeadquartersBeirut
Military wingLebanese Resistance Regiments (1975 – 1991)[5]
Al-Abbas Force (Since 2006 [citation needed])[6]
Ideology
Political positionCentre-right
National affiliationMarch 8 Alliance
Colours    Green, Red
SloganTo struggle against oppression (Tagline)[10]
Parliamentary blocDevelopment and Liberation
Parliament of Lebanon
15 / 128
Cabinet of Lebanon
3 / 24
Party flag
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Amal Movement
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The Amal Movement (Arabic: حركة أمل, romanized: Ḥarakat Amal, lit. 'Hope Movement') is a Lebanese political party and former militia affiliated mainly with the Shia community of Lebanon. It was founded by Musa al-Sadr and Hussein el-Husseini in 1974 as the "Movement of the Deprived." The party has been led by Nabih Berri since 1980.[1] The Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut, Grégoire Haddad, as well as Mostafa Chamran, were among the founders of the movement.[2][3]

The Amal movement gained attention from Shia outcry after the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr and saw a renewal in popularity after Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978. The Iranian Revolution of 1978–79 also provided momentum for the party.[14] The Amal Movement is the largest predominantly Shia party in parliament, having fourteen representatives to Hezbollah's thirteen. Amal has an alliance with Hezbollah [citation needed].

Name

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The movement's current name was originally used by the Deprived Movement's militia, the "Lebanese Resistance Regiments" (Arabic: أفواج المقاومة اللبنانية). This name, when abbreviated, created the acronym "Amal", which is Arabic for "hope".[5]

Origins

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Harakat al-Mahrumin / Movement of the Deprived

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Harakat al-Mahrumin (Arabic: حركة المحرومين meaning The Movement of the Deprived or The Movement of the Dispossessed or The Movement of the Disinherited) was established by Imam Musa al-Sadr and member of parliament Hussein el-Husseini in 1974,[15] as an attempt to reform the Lebanese system, although the beginnings can be traced to 1969 in declarations by the Imam al-Sadr calling upon peace and equality among all Lebanese confessions and religions, so that no one confession would remain "deprived" in any region in Lebanon, noting that the Shia community in Lebanon remained the poorest and most neglected by the Lebanese government.[citation needed]

While acknowledging its support base to be the "traditionally under-represented politically and economically disadvantaged" Shi'a community,[16] it aimed, according to Palmer-Harik, to seek social justice for all deprived Lebanese.[17] Although influenced by Islamic ideas, it was a secular movement trying to unite people along communal rather than religious or ideological lines.[18]

The movement had support from many confessions, but membership remained mainly within the Shia confession and was considered as a definitive Shia force against the traditional Shia families hegemony at the time.

The Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut, Grégoire Haddad, was among the founders of the movement.[2][3]

The movement was absorbed in 1975 into what is now called the Amal Movement.

Lebanese Resistance Regiments

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On January 20, 1975, the 'Lebanese Resistance Regiments' (Arabic: أفواج المقاومة اللبنانية | Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya), also designated variously as the 'Lebanese Resistance Battalions', 'The Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance',[19] 'Lebanese Resistance Detachments' and 'Battalions de la Resistance Libanaise (BRL)' in French were formed as the military wing of Harakat al-Mahrumin under the leadership of al-Sadr, and came to be popularly known as Amal (in Arabic أمل) from the acronym Afwaj al-Mouqawma Al-Lubnaniyya).[17]

Amal Movement

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A poster of Amal Movement's two main figures, Nabih Berri and Musa al Sadr

Amal became one of the most important Shi'a Muslim militias during the Lebanese Civil War. It grew strong with the support of, and through its ties with, Syria[18] and the 300,000 Shi'a internal refugees from southern Lebanon after the Israeli bombings in the early 1980s. Amal's practical objectives were to gain greater respect for Lebanon's Shi'ite population and the allocation of a larger share of governmental resources for the Shi'ite-dominated southern part of the country.[20]

At its zenith, the militia had 14,000 troops. Amal fought a long campaign against Palestinian refugees during the Lebanese Civil War, called the War of the Camps. After the War of the Camps, Amal fought a bloody battle against rival Shi'a group Hezbollah for control of Beirut, which provoked Syrian military intervention. Hezbollah itself was formed by religious members of Amal who had left after Nabih Berri's assumption of full control and the subsequent resignation of most of Amal's earliest members.

Timeline

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On January 20, 1975 T5, the Lebanese Resistance Detachments, also called 'The Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance' in English, is formed as a military wing of The Movement of the Disinherited under the leadership of al-Sadr. In 1978 the founder Al-Sadr disappears in mysterious circumstances while visiting Libya. He was succeeded by Hussein el-Husseini as leader of Amal.

In 1980, Palestinian guerrillas attempt to assassinate then-Secretary General Hussein el-Husseini by launching missiles into his home, outside Beirut. El-Husseini had refused, despite Syrian pressure, to get involved in the Lebanese Civil War and fight alongside the PLO or any other faction.

Subsequently, in 1980, el-Husseini resigned from the leadership of Amal and was replaced by Nabih Berri, marking the entry of Amal in the Lebanese Civil War.

In the summer of 1982 Husayn Al-Musawi, deputy head and official spokesman of Amal, broke away to form the Islamist Islamic Amal Movement.

In May 1985, heavy fighting erupted between Amal and Palestinian camp militias for the control of the Sabra, Shatila and Burj el-Barajneh camps in Beirut, sparking the so-called "War of the Camps" which lasted until 1987.

In December 1985, Nabih Berri of Amal, Walid Jumblatt of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and Elie Hobeika of the Lebanese Forces signed the Tripartite Accord in Damascus which is supposed to give strong influence to Damascus regarding Lebanese matters. The agreement never came into effect due to Hobeika's ousting.

Two months later Amal militiamen were driven out of West Beirut by their Communist (PLA) and Druze (PSP) rivals in a week of street fighting, artillery exchanges and looting which led to the Syrian army returning to Beirut on 22 February after an absence of three and a half years.[21]

On February 17, 1988, the American Chief of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observer group in Lebanon, Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, was abducted and later killed after meeting with Amal's political leader of southern Lebanon. Amal responded by launching a campaign against Hezbollah in the south, It was believed that Hezbollah abducted him. Hezbollah to this day denies it and insists that it was done to create problems between them and the Amal movement.[22]

In April 1988 Amal launched an all-out assault on Hezbollah positions in south Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut. Early in May 1988 Hezbollah gained control of 80% of the Shi'ite suburbs of Beirut through well-timed assaults.[23]

In 1989, Amal accepted the Taif agreement (mainly authored by el-Husseini) in order to end the civil war.

In September 1991, with background in the Syrian controlled end of the Lebanese Civil War in October 1990, 2,800 Amal troops joined the Lebanese army.

Lebanese Civil War

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War of the Camps

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Main article: War of the Camps

The War of the Camps was a series of controversial battles in the mid-1980s between Amal and Palestinian groups. The Druze-oriented Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the leftists, and also Hezbollah supported the Palestinians, while the Syrian government backed Amal.

First battle (May 1985)

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Although most of the Palestinian guerrillas were expelled during the 1982 Israeli invasion, Palestinian militias began to regain their footing after the Israeli withdrawal from first Beirut, then Sidon and Tyre. Syria viewed this revival with some anxiety: though in the same ideological camp, Damascus had little control over most Palestinians organizations and was afraid that the build-up of Palestinian forces could lead to a new Israeli invasion. In Lebanon, Shia–Palestinian relations had been very tense since the late 1960s.[24]

After the multinational force withdrew from Beirut in February 1984, Amal and the PSP took control of west Beirut and Amal built a number of outposts around the camps, in Beirut and the south. On April 15, 1985, Amal and the PSP attacked Al-Murabitun, the main Lebanese Sunni militia and the closest ally of the PLO in Lebanon. Al-Murabitun were vanquished and their leader, Ibrahim Kulaylat was sent into exile. On May 19, 1985, heavy fighting erupted between Amal and the Palestinians for the control of the Sabra, Shatila and Burj el-Barajneh camps, all in Beirut.[24]

On May 28, 1985, Amal suffered a suicide attack by four young female Palestinian suicide bombers in Shatila.[24] Despite its efforts, Amal could not take the control of the camps. The death toll remains unknown, with estimates ranging from a few hundreds to a few thousands. This and heavy Arab pressure led to a cease-fire on June 17.

Second battle (May 1986)

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The situation remained tense and fights occurred again in September 1985 and March 1986. On May 19, 1986, heavy fighting erupted again. Despite new armaments provided by Syria, Amal could not take control of the camps. Many cease-fires were announced, but most of them did not last more than a few days. The situation began to cool after Syria deployed some troops on June 24, 1986.

Third battle (September 1986)

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There was tension in the south, an area where Shi'as and Palestinians were both present. This led to frequent clashes. On September 29, 1986, fighting erupted at the Rashidiyye camp (Tyre). The conflict immediately spread to Sidon and Beirut. Palestinian forces managed to occupy the Amal-controlled town of Maghdouché on the eastern hills of Sidon to open the road to Rashidiyye. Syrian forces helped Amal and Israel launched air strikes against PLO position around Maghdouche.

A cease-fire was negotiated between Amal and pro-Syrian Palestinian groups on December 15, 1986, but it was rejected by Yasser Arafat's Fatah. Fatah tried to appease the situation by giving some of its positions to Hezbollah and to the Murabitun. The situation became relatively calm for a while, but the bombing against the camps continued. In Beirut, a blockade of the camps led to a dramatic lack of food and medications inside the camps.

In early 1987, the fighting spread to Hezbollah and the PSP who supported the Palestinians. The PSP, having won numerous battles, quickly seized large portions of west Beirut. Consequently, Syria occupied west Beirut beginning February 21, 1987. On April 7, 1987, Amal finally lifted the siege and handed its positions around the camps to the Syrian army. According to The New York Times (March 10, 1992, citing figures from the Lebanese police), 3,781 were killed in the fighting.

War of Brothers

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Main article: War of Brothers

On February 17, 1988, Col William R. Higgins, American Chief of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observer group in Lebanon, was abducted from his UN vehicle between Tyre and Nakoura after a meeting with Abd al-Majid Saleh, Amal's political leader in southern Lebanon. It soon became "clear that Sheikh al-Musawi, the commander to Hezbollah's Islamic Resistance, had been personally responsible for the abduction of Lt. Col Higgins in close cooperation with both Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, the local commander of Hizballah's military wing, and Mustafa al-Dirani, the former head of Amal's security service."[22]

This was seen as a direct challenge to Amal by Hezbollah, and Amal responded by launching an offensive against Hezbollah in the south where it "scores decisive military victories ... leading to the expulsion of a number of Hizballah clergy to the Beqqa". In Beirut's southern suburbs however, where fighting also raged, Hizballah was much more successful. "[E]lements within Hizballah and the Iranian Pasdaran established a joint command to assassinate high-ranking Amal officials and carry out operations against Amal checkpoints and centers."[25]

By May, Amal had suffered major losses, its members were defecting to Hezbollah, and by June, Syria had to intervene militarily to rescue Amal from defeat.[22] In January 1989, a truce in the "ferocious" fighting between Hizballah and Amal was arranged by Syrian and Iranian intervention. "Under this agreement, Amal's authority over the security of southern Lebanon [is] recognized while Hizballah [is] permitted to maintain only a nonmilitary presence through political, cultural, and informational programmes."[26]

Amal after the war

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Amal was a strong supporter of Syria after 1990 and endorsed Syria's military presence in Lebanon. After Rafik Hariri's assassination in 2005, Amal opposed the Syrian withdrawal and did not take part in the Cedar Revolution.

Since 1992, the party has been represented in the Lebanese parliament and the government. Amal's enemies often criticize it for corruption among its semi-major leaders. Nabih Berri was elected speaker of parliament in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009 and 2016. Following the 2018 Lebanese general election, Amal has had 17 representatives in the 128-seat Lebanese parliament. This was an increase from the 13 representatives at the 2009 election, 14 at the 2005 election, 10 at the 2000 election, 8 at the 1996 election and 5 at the 1992 election.

According to Amal officials, the party's militants "have been involved in every major battle since fighting began"[27] during the 2006 Lebanon War, and at least 8 members were reported to have been killed.[27]

Amal's military wing began participating in the 2023 Israel-Lebanon border clashes in November by launching strikes on Israeli military barracks;[28][29] one of its members was later killed by Israeli shelling of the town of Rab Thalathine.[30] Another fighter was killed in August by an Israeli strike on a car in the town of Khiam.[31] Two fighters from Al-Abbas Force, an elite unit of the Amal military wing, were killed in battles against Israeli forces invading Lebanon in October 2024.[32]

General election summary

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Election year # of

overall votes

% of

overall vote

# of

overall seats won[a]

+/– Leader
1992
17 / 128
Increase17
 Nabih Berri
1996 6.25%
21 / 128
Increase 4
2000 7.81%
16 / 128
Decrease 5
2005 10.93%
14 / 128
Decrease 2
2009
13 / 128
Decrease 1
2018 204,199 (#3) 11.04%
17 / 128
Increase 4
2022 190,161 (#3) 10.52%
15 / 128
Decrease 2

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ Table also includes MPs of Berri's bloc/alliance and are not directly affiliated with the party.
  1. ^ a b Sepehr Zabih (September 1982). "Aspects of Terrorism in Iran". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. International Terrorism. 463: 84–94. doi:10.1177/0002716282463001007. JSTOR 1043613. S2CID 145391253.
  2. ^ a b c Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007
  3. ^ a b c Hizbullah, a progressive Islamic party? - Interview with Joseph Alagha
  4. ^ Cobban, Helena "Hizbullah’s New Fact" Archived 3 February 2007 at the Wayback Machine Boston Review. Accessed February 2, 2007. Originally published in the April/May 2005 issue of Boston Review
  5. ^ a b Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1987)
  6. ^ Dana Polak (6 October 2024). "Al-Abbas Force". Israel Alma.
  7. ^ Norton, Augustus Richard (1987). Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin: University of Texas Press. p. 39. ISBN 978-0292730403.
  8. ^ a b Rihani, May A. (2014). Cultures Without Borders. Author House. ISBN 9781496936462. Retrieved 26 May 2016.
  9. ^ Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack (2011). Shi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231144278. Retrieved 2 July 2016.
  10. ^ a b "Islam Times – Imam Musa Al Sadr – his life and disappearance". Islam Times. Archived from the original on 5 June 2016. Retrieved 26 May 2016.
  11. ^ "مركز الإمام موسى الصدر للأبحاث والدراسات :: محطات مضيئة » سيرة الإمام". www.imamsadr.net. Retrieved 2019-12-03.
  12. ^ Ostovar, Afshon P. (2009). "Guardians of the Islamic Revolution Ideology, Politics, and the Development of Military Power in Iran (1979–2009)" (PhD Thesis). University of Michigan. Retrieved 26 July 2013.
  13. ^ Nicholas Blanford (2011). Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel. Random House. pp. 16, 32. ISBN 9781400068364.
  14. ^ Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short Story. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. Print.
  15. ^ Nasr, Vali, 2006, The Shia Revival, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 85
  16. ^ Byman, D., 2005, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.82
  17. ^ a b Palmer-Harik, J., 2004, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd
  18. ^ a b Byman, D., 2005, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
  19. ^ "Gaddafi charged for cleric kidnap". BBC. 2008-08-27. Retrieved 2016-08-28.
  20. ^ Palmer-Harik, J., 2004, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd
  21. ^ Middle East International No 295, 4 March 1987; Jim Muir pp.3-5
  22. ^ a b c Ranstorp, Hizb'allah, (1997), p.101
  23. ^ Hezbollah: Between Tehran and Damascus Archived 2007-10-13 at the Wayback Machine
  24. ^ a b c Acosta, Benjamin (2016). "Dying for Survival: Why Militant Organizations Continue to Conduct Suicide Attacks". Journal of Peace Research. 53 (2): 180–196. doi:10.1177/0022343315618001. S2CID 147189602.
  25. ^ Voice of Lebanon, 0615 gmt 18 April 88-BBC/SWB/ME/0131, 21 April 1988; and Ha'aretz, 18 April 1988, quoted in Ranstorp, Hizb'allah, (1997), p.101
  26. ^ Ranstorp, Hizb'allah, (1997), p.102
  27. ^ a b Israeli troops suffer largest one-day loss – CNN, July 27, 2006
  28. ^ "Second Shia militia group joins clashes on Lebanese border". Roya News. 2023-11-11. Retrieved 2023-11-12.
  29. ^ "Iran Update, November 11, 2023". Institute for the Study of War. 2023-11-11. Retrieved 2023-11-12.
  30. ^ ""أمل" تنعى أحد عناصرها... قضى بقصف إسرائيليّ على بلدة رب ثلاثين". An-Nahar. 2023-11-11. Retrieved 2023-11-12.
  31. ^ Report, Agency (2024-08-25). "One dead in Israeli strike-Lebanon ministry". Punch Newspapers. Retrieved 2024-08-25.
  32. ^ Polak, Dana (2024-10-06). "Al-Abbas Force". Alma Research and Education Center. Retrieved 2024-10-30.

References

[edit]
  • Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1987.
  • Afaf Sabeh McGowan, John Roberts, As’ad Abu Khalil, and Robert Scott Mason, Lebanon: A Country Study, area handbook series, Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA Pam 550-24), Washington D.C. 1989. - [1]
  • Byman, D., Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  • Edgar O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon, 1975–92, Palgrave Macmillan, London 1998. ISBN 978-0-333-72975-5
  • Fawwaz Traboulsi, Identités et solidarités croisées dans les conflits du Liban contemporain; Chapitre 12: L'économie politique des milices: le phénomène mafieux, Thèse de Doctorat d'Histoire – 1993, Université de Paris VIII, 2007. (in French) – [2]
  • Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.
  • Palmer-Harik, J., Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004.
  • Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis,New York, St. Martins Press, 1997.
  • Seyyed Ali Haghshenas, "Social and political structure of Lebanon and its influence on appearance of Amal Movement, " Iran, Tehran 2009.
  • Robin Wright, Sacred Rage, Simon and Schuster, 2001.
  • Fouad Ajami, "Gadhafi and the Vanished Imam", Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011.
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